INTRODUCTION
Yangge Dance is a popular folk dance in rural China. Its basic pattern is three paces forwards, followed by two paces back; then a step to the right, followed by a step to the left. In our view, Yangge Dance is an apt simile for the process of legal development relating to liability for medical malpractice in the People's Republic of China (P. R. China).' The three paces forward refer to successive reforms furthering the interests of patients, following an initial period-dating from the foundation of P.R. China in 1949 until 1987-during which medical malpractice was handled by an administrative system without formal liability rules. The first of these advances came in 1987, when the existing administrative system was formalized by an administrative regulation, 2 the Rules on the Handling of Medical Accidents, 3 which provided not only for administrative sanctions in the event of malpractice but also for a (limited) liability to pay compensation for resultant injury. A further advance came in 2002 with the amendment of this system of administrative liability by the Regulations on the Handling of Medical Accidents. 4 The third and final advance, consolidated by rulings of the Supreme People's Court (SPC) 5 in 2002-2003, was to recognize that liability could be established-independently of the administrative system-under the ordinary rules of tort 6 liability, then embodied in the General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (GPCL). 7 Conversely, the enactment of the new Tort Liability Law (TLL) in 2009, taking effect on July 1, 2010, arguably marks a step backwards, subordinating the interests of patients in favor of the interests of the medical community. A second backwards step, through the prospective enactment of additional rules relating to liability for medical malpractice 5. The SPC is P.R. China's highest court. In addition to its role as P.R. China's final court of appeal, the SPC also has the power to issue quasi-legislative "judicial interpretations" on specific issues concerning the application of law in the adjudicative work of the people's courts. Depending on the circumstances, judicial interpretations are issued as an "interpretation," "provision," "reply," or "decision." See Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu si fa jie shi gong zuo de gui ding [ 6. An aggrieved party is entitled to proceed in tort even where the conduct complained of is both a tort and a breach of contract Zhong hua ren min gong he guo he tong fa [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] art 122 (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=97 (last visited Oct 24, 2011). In practice, claims for medical injuries under general civil law are normally brought on the basis of tort rather than contractual liability.
7. Xing tian ren zhong hua ren min gong he guo de min shi fa lu de yi ban yuan ze [General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China] (adopted by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr.
12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited Oct. 24, 2011) [hereinafter GPCL]. The GPCL was the first legislation in P.R. China to deal comprehensively with general civil law, including the law of tort (which was addressed in Section 3 of Chapter 6). that further advantage healthcare providers, may also be anticipated in the future.
The sideways steps of Yangge Dance-first to the right, then to the left-may be taken to refer to the constant interplay (at least since 1992) between the two concurrent systems of liability for medical malpracticeone administrative, broadly favoring the interests of the medical community, and the other tortious, broadly favoring the interests of patients.
To compare the two liability regimes (administrative and tortious), and to show their development over time, the analysis below addresses four common dimensions of the parallel systems, namely, the basis of the cause of action, the burden of proof, the process of (technical or judicial) "identification" 8 used to establish that a compensable medical injury has been suffered, and the assessment of damages.
I. THE WIDER HEALTHCARE CONTEXT 9
P.R. China was founded in 1949. In the early years of the Communist regime, healthcare-and social welfare provision in general-was organized on a commune or workplace basis, with free basic healthcare for all. All medical facilities were publicly owned and operated; doctors were employees of the State; there was no private medicine. The system achieved significant success against a range of health indicators (e.g., life expectancy, infant mortality), with its performance matching or exceeding that of many countries with superior economic resources. 10 With the reform and opening-up policy adopted in 1978,1 the commune system was dismantled as private enterprise was encouraged. Many state-owned enterprises closed. The social safety net the communes and public-sector employment provided was abruptly swept away. The proportion of the population covered by health insurance declined sharply. Though some doctors (especially doctors in rural areas and practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine) began to practice privately, most healthcare 8. Also translated as "authentication" by some authors. See, e.g., Ding, supra note 1, passim; Xi & Yang, supra note 1, passim.
9. facilities remained under state ownership. But user fees were introduced even for public healthcare and providers were generally encouraged to operate as businesses.1 2 Substantial disparities arose in the quality of care provided, reflecting widely divergent levels of investment. The resultant problems were particularly acute in rural areas. 13 Since 1997, China has striven to address inequalities in healthcare provision with successive reform programs supported by significant investment. 14 The voluntary medical insurance schemes previously applying to urban workers and rural residents have been replaced, and contributions are now subsidized to a significant degree by central and local government. A medical assistance program (Medicare) has been introduced for the poor. A network of community health centers, dependent on State financing rather than user fees, has been created. Efforts have been made to address skill shortages-in particular, in remote areas and in primary carethrough education and training. New initiatives have sought to secure the maintenance of appropriate quality standards, with an emphasis on better record keeping and the reporting of adverse events 1 5 to supplement the traditional forms of government oversight (licensing and accreditation of practitioners and facilities, approval of drugs, etc. According to World Health Organization statistics, China's total expenditure on health as a percentage of gross domestic product was 4.3% in 2007 (as compared with a global average of 9.7%, and 15.7% and 8.8% for the United States and European Region respectively).
20 Of the total, 44.7% was general government expenditure and 55.3% private expenditure. General government expenditure on health was 9.9% of total government expenditure. 2 1 Reflecting the high levels of direct (out-of-pocket) payment for medicines and medical services, noted above, only 7.1% of private expenditure on health was on private prepaid plans. 22 Per capita total expenditure on health was equivalent to just USD $ 43, far below not just Europe and the United States (USD $ 2,035 and USD $ 7,285 respectively) but also the global average of USD $ 802. Just to give these figures is to As detailed above, medical services were treated as a matter of social welfare in the early years of P.R. China after its foundation in 1949. There was no legislation on liability or compensation for medical malpractice, 23 and disputes were normally settled on an informal basis within the administrative framework. As early as 1953, the central government investigated and reported improper acts on the part of medical institutions and personnel; these acts included serious accidents that caused death or deterioration of patients' conditions as a result of negligence on the part of hospitals and major fault in nursing. 24 At that time, judges believed dispute settlement through mediation served judicial policy better than litigation, and declined to impose civil liability. 2 5 A Reply by the Supreme People's Court, dated January 18, 1964, states:
In dealing with medical accidents, the court should not award economic compensation, but may seek other types of remedy for patients who suffer death or disability or loss of income as a result of medical accidents. Therefore, you may advise the department of public health of 23. All laws dating from before 1949 were repealed on the foundation of P.R. China. Although there were periodic attempts thereafter to legislate a civil code, none has yet been successful, though a first concrete step was taken in that direction with the enactment of the GPCL in 1986. See GPCL, supra note 7. your province to seek remedies through joint efforts with labor, personnel and civil administration departments, and execute them. 26 Few claims of medical malpractice were litigated at this time, and little attention was given to compensation for harm caused by medical treatment.
In 1978, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) adopted a policy of reform and opening-up, and China began a transformation from a planned to a market economy. As Chinese society underwent a remarkable change, the foundations of the established medical system began to shake (as detailed above). With the progress of medical reform, more medical disputes arose, requiring the improvement of relevant legal mechanisms. But, generally speaking, most workers still enjoyed free medical services at this time, and medical institutions remained part of the social welfare system, funded by government, and it seems from the very few civil cases discussed in the secondary literature at this time (in contrast with the number of criminal cases discussed there) that few disputes actually went to court. In practice, the main focus as regards medical malpractice was on criminal liability, even though the then-effective Criminal Law, promulgated by the National People's Congress in 1979, did not criminalize medical malpractice as such. 2 7 Doctors were charged with various crimes of general application, such as negligent killing, negligently causing a serious accident, or neglect of duty, or sometimes with crimes specifically relating to medical malpractice (e.g., negligently causing a serious medical accident or criminal medical fault) without any express basis in the legislative text. 28 32 if a victim has suffered material losses as a result of the defendant's criminal act, he has the right to file an "incidental civil action" during the course of the criminal proceeding. 33 The incidental civil action is generally heard together with the criminal trial, but may be continued after the criminal trial has ended if necessary to prevent it being excessively delayed. 34 So far as can be ascertained, however, criminal prosecutions of doctors are rare.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY REGIME
A national regime of administrative liability for medical accidents was established by the Medical Accident Rules of 1987,35 and reformed by the Medical Accident Regulations of 2002. Both enactments were administrative regulations drafted by the Ministry of Health and promulgated by the central government (State Council), and were applicable to both public and private healthcare.
A. The Medical Accident Rules 1987

Context
The Medical Accident Rules 1987 were enacted when the provision of free medical services, including medical treatment by a healthcare institu- tion, was part of social welfare policy. Most hospitals were still stateowned at the time. As a result, it was thought desirable to place a strict limit on the liability of medical institutions that did harm to their patients when performing medical treatment. The 1987 Rules created a formal system of administrative liability in cases of medical accident in which claims for compensation were submitted in the first instance to the health administration (for adjudication or mediation), with the option of a new hearing before a court if either party was unsatisfied with the outcome. 36 In hearing such a claim, the court would apply the 1987 Rules rather than the ordinary principles of tortious liability. The enactment of the Rules immediately after the GPCL strongly suggests that their intention was to exclude the GPCL's application to medical accidents so as to limit the circumstances giving rise to liability and the amount of compensation to be paid when liability was established.
Main Features of the Administrative Liability Regime, 1987-2002 a. Basis of the Cause ofAction
Under the Rules, the basic component of the cause of action was a dispute about compensation for harm caused by a medical accident. 37 The term "medical accident" referred to a situation where the patient suffered death, disability, or organ damage resulting in dysfunction, as a direct result of fault in diagnosis, medical treatment, or nursing on the part of medical personnel. 38 Medical accidents included "malpractice accidents" and "technical accidents." A medical malpractice accident was an accident caused by medical personnel due to a breach of duty as a result of the violation of rules or regulations, or of procedures for diagnosis, cure or nursing. A technical medical accident was an accident caused by medical personnel due to negligent treatment not involving the violation of any such rule or procedure. Accidents involving malpractice were regarded as more serious than those involving mere negligence in treatment, 39 with administrative sanctions (e.g., dismissal, demotion or warning) attaching to the responsible personnel, while such sanctions applied to technical accidents only where a seriousness threshold was crossed, and even then the sanctions applied were less severe. 40 
Rules on the
b. Burden ofProof
Under the Rules of 1987, the burden of proof lay on the patient. The Rules required that, when a medical accident (or an incident which might later be recognized as a medical accident) occurred, the medical institution should assign a specific person to properly keep such original materials as were relevant. 4 1 In reality, however, it was possible for the medical institution to alter, forge, conceal, or even destroy the original materials. Consequently, it seems to have been difficult for patients-who were further disadvantaged by their own lack of medical knowledge-to satisfy the burden of proof lying on them. So they had to apply for "technical identification" (see below), which itself tended to favor the hospital. 42 
c. The Identification Process
A central feature of the administrative liability regime established by the 1987 Rules was the process of "technical identification." This was the procedure by which a committee of medical experts, selected by the health administration (i.e., the responsible provincial, regional or municipal department of health), 4 3 would investigate the circumstances giving rise to a claim and report their conclusions to the appropriate tribunal. A decision of a local committee could be appealed to a higher level (e.g., a provincial committee) but the outcome of the process was in practice binding on the tribunal (whether the health administration or a court), except to the extent that the court could remit the case to be reviewed either by the original committee or a higher-level committee. Technical identification could be carried out at the level of the province, city, county or municipal district;44 there was no nationwide organization undertaking the process. Since most hospitals were still state-owned at the time, technical identification organized by the local health administration was just a case of (in the common parlance) "making the father the judge of the son." Hospitals were favored with the excuse that medical malpractice did not amount to a "medical accident" but merely a "medical error" giving rise to no liability to pay compensation. 
d. Assessment ofDamages
Where an occurrence was identified as a medical accident, the patient was to be awarded a lump sum payment of compensation according to the accident's grade of severity on a scale of 1-3 (see below), its circumstances and the patient's pre-existing condition. The Rules provided that the level of compensation should be formulated by the provincial, regional or municipal government in whose area the accident occurred. 45 The sums awarded were small, and reflected the grade of the accident rather than the loss actually suffered by the patient. As an example, we may consider the levels of compensation prescribed in Tianjin, a municipality directly under the central government near Beijing: 46 Grade I medical accidents (causing death): compensation in the range of RMB 3,000 to 4,000;47 compensation for infants under the age of three was RMB 1,000; compensation for neonates was RMB 700.
Grade II medical accidents (causing serious disability or severe dysfunction): RMB 3,000 to 5,000.
Grade III medical accidents (causing disability or dysfunction): RMB 2,000 to 3,000; compensation for infants under the age of three was RMB 700; compensation for neonates was RMB 500.
These compensation levels were actually very low even when they were introduced (1988), and they did not change in the fourteen years until the enactment of a new set of Regulations in 2002.
B. The Medical Accident Regulations 200248
Context
A new set of administrative regulations replaced the previously enacted rules in 2002, though they maintained the basic features of the previous regime, at least in broad outline. The Medical Accident Regulations 2002 were intended to respond to widespread criticism of the strict limits on liability in the previous regime and they may thus be considered to have made some progress towards the better protection of patients' interests. 45 However, there was still a big gap between the medical and legal community's estimations of the proper extent of liability.
Main Features of the Administrative Liability Regime, 2002 onwards a. Basis of the Cause ofAction
The 2002 Regulations defined "medical accident" as an accident caused by a medical institution or its medical personnel resulting in personal injuries to a patient due to negligence in medical activities as a result of the violation of laws, administrative regulations or departmental rules on medical and health administration, or of standards or procedures for diagnosis, cure and nursing. 4 9 Compared with the Rules of 1987, the new Regulations expanded the scope of medical accident in two aspects. First, harm was no longer limited to death, disability or functional dysfunction: any physical injury caused by negligent medical treatment was covered. Four grades of accident were now recognized (instead of the previous three): death and serious disability (Grade I); moderate disability (Grade II); mild disability (Grade III); and other obvious injury (Grade IV).50 Second, causality was no longer limited to direct causation: indirect causation was also included.
b. Burden ofProof
Though the burden of proof was still on the patient, the 2002 Regulations imposed a more onerous recordkeeping obligation on medical institutions, who were to compile and properly preserve medical records as required by the health administration department of the State Council. In the case of emergency treatment to save the patient's life, where timely record keeping might not be possible, the medical person concerned had an obligation to update the record within six hours of the treatment being given. 51 Alteration, forgery, concealment, destruction, and seizure of medical records were strictly forbidden, 52 on penalty of administrative or disciplinary sanction or, in prescribed circumstances, criminal punishment. 53 Patients were entitled to a copy of their record on request. 
c. Technical Identification
There were two significant changes as regards the process of technical identification. 55 First, the responsibility for organizing the process was shifted from the health administration to the medical associations (i.e., the professional bodies representing healthcare practitioners). In the 1987 Rules, the technical identification was organized by the health administration itself, which was also the administrative authority of the hospital that was being sued, and this created a very obvious conflict of interests. To address this unsatisfactory situation, the 2002 Regulations required the health administration department concerned to forward any report of serious medical fault from a medical institution, and every application to settle a medical accident dispute from a party to it, to the responsible medical association for the purposes of organizing the necessary technical identification. 56 Second, technical identification at a national level became available. In addition to the technical identifications organized by local medical associations, the 2002 Regulations provided for the Chinese Medical Association 57 to organize technical identification of difficult and complicated medical accident disputes having significant national importance. 58 In spite of these major changes, the new system attracted criticism because the medical associations had such close links with the health administration. Though formally independent, in reality the medical associations perform a semi-official role and are closely linked with and dependent upon government at all levels, with leading positions in them being taken by leaders of health administration departments. Consequently, the new identification system was perceived to involve medical institutions "shielding" one another, and still tended to protect hospitals from liability. 59 55. In departmental rules issued shortly after the Medical Accident Regulations 2002, the aim of technical identification was described as being to reach a conclusion as to the following issues (amongst others): (1) whether the medical treatment violated a law, administrative regulation or departmental rule or the applicable standards and procedures for diagnosis, cure or nursing; (2) the causal relationship between the medical fault (if any) and the personal injury; (3) the extent of responsibility to be attributed to the medical fault for causing injury in the medical accident; and (4) 
d Assessment ofDamages
In contrast with the 1987 Rules, which left the amount of compensation payable for each grade of medical accident to be determined by provincial, regional or municipal administrative rules, the 2002 Regulations treated the loss suffered by the patient-rather than the grade of the accident-as decisive, and stipulated in some detail the heads of loss in respect of which compensation would be awarded. Eleven items were listed: (1) medical expenses; (2) loss of income (subject to a cap of three times annual earnings in the place the medical accident occurred); (3) a food allowance during hospitalization; (4) expenses incurred looking after the patient; (5) a living allowance in the event of disability; (6) a disability allowance for the purchase of appliances; (7) funeral expenses; (8) the living expenses of a dependent; (9) a traffic allowance; (10) a lodging allowance; and (11) a solatium for emotional harm, capped by reference to annual living expenses in the place of the accident. 60 Conspicuous because of its absence from this list is compensation for death itself, in contrast with the ordinary rules of tortious liability where such compensation is expressly allowed (in addition to compensation for the living expenses of dependents and a solatium for emotional harm resulting from the bereavement). 6 1 This is the principal reason why the legal community has taken comprehensive measures to sideline the Medical Accident Regulations 2002 when proceedings are brought in court.
A significant feature of the administrative liability scheme as amended in 2002 was the requirement to apportion liability to reflect not only the grade of the accident but also both the extent of responsibility to be attributed to the medical fault and the role played by the patient's underlying condition. 62 For example, where a fifty-one-year-old man was treated in hospital for an abdominal injury and died, the main cause of death being the hospital's medical mistakes, and a contributing cause being the man's previous liver problems, this constituted a Grade I medical accident where the hospital had to bear the main responsibility, but, taking account of the 60. Medical Accident Regulations 2002, supra note 49, at art. 50. The solatium for emotional harm is calculated by reference to annual average living expenses in the place where the medical accident occurs. In the case of death, a maximum of six times the annual amount may be paid; in the case of non-fatal disability, the maximum is three times the annual amount. See id. at art.
50(11).
61. patient's pre-surgery medical conditions, the defendant's liability was determined to be only 80 percent. 63 IV. THE TORT LIABILITY REGIME
A. Recourse to the General Principles of Civil Liability
Responding to dissatisfaction about the low levels of compensation paid under the administrative liability regime (at that time governed by the Rules of 1987), the SPC began unobtrusively to allow injured patients access to higher compensation awards by recognizing their ability to bring their claim on the basis of tortious liability arising under the GPCL; if successful, the compensation would be calculated under the more generous damages rules of the GPCL rather than those of the administrative liability regime. In a formal Reply to the High Court of Tianjin in 1992, the SPC stated that the local court could properly handle medical accident cases in accordance with either the relevant provisions of the GPCL, or the State Council's Medical Accident Regulations (combined with the local rules implementing the Regulations), according to the specific conditions of the case. 64 The SPC's Reply thus allowed the court in Tianjin to make a compensatory award under the GPCL that was much higher than would have been possible under the administrative liability regime. Even though the medical community insisted that the GPCL should not be applied so indiscriminatingly that it came to replace the administrative regime, 65 system of liability for medical malpractice. 66 The relationship of the two liability regimes to each other, and the differences between them, may now be considered with reference to the four criteria proposed above: the cause of action, the burden of proof, the identification process, and the assessment of damages.
B. Elements of the Tort Liability Regime
Cause of Action
The SPC Notice provided that, where a lawsuit is brought before any court 67 regarding a dispute over compensation for medical malpractice which occurred after the 2002 Regulations came into force, it is to be resolved by referring to the relevant provisions in the Regulations; for disputes over compensation for patient injury attributed to factors other than medical malpractice, the provisions of the GPCL apply. 68 Thus, if a patient sued the hospital on the basis of a medical accident, the court would decide the case under the administrative liability regime. If the patient chose to sue the hospital on the basis of fault sufficient to establish ordinary civil liability (commonly termed "medical fault," though the GPCL laid down no special rule for fault in a medical context), the court would decide the case according to the GPCL and, most importantly, would calculate the damages according to the SPC Interpretation dealing with compensation for personal injury in civil cases. 69 We consider below the huge difference this made to the quantum of compensation. In practice, the courts allowed patients the freedom to sue hospitals on the basis of medical fault rather than medical accident, and most patients chose to proceed on this basis in view of the advantages of the tort liability regime. 
Burden of Proof
Though the burden of proof in civil litigation normally lies on the plaintiff, in 2002 a Judicial Interpretation of the SPC introduced a reversal in the burden of proving causation and fault in claims alleging medical fault. 70 This was a crucial feature of the tort liability regime applying to medical injuries as developed at this time by the courts in parallel to the administrative liability regime. The relevant passage stipulates: "In tort actions relating to medical practice, medical institutions shall bear the burden of proving both the lack of a causal relationship between the medical practice and the harmful consequences, and the absence of medical fault." 7 1 In short, causation and fault were presumed and had to be disproved by the hospital. This contrasted with the administrative liability regime where the burden of proof was always on the plaintiff.
The Identification Process
The SPC also decided that a dual system should apply to the process of identification, depending on whether administrative or tortious liability was at stake. 72 If, in civil proceedings pursued on the basis of medical accident, the court decided-upon application by either party concerned or in the exercise of its own powers-that there should be a technical identification, this would be conducted by a medical association prescribed by regulation. However, where an identification procedure was required in a dispute over compensation for patient injury not attributed to a medical accident (i.e., in an action brought under the tort liability regime), a "judicial identification" would be organized by the court itself, rather than by the health administration (as under the 1987 Rules) or a medical association (as under the 2002 Regulations). 73 This was important because, under the administrative liability system, most technical identifications concluded that there had been no medical accident, 74 and medical institutions were consequently exempted from liability to a large extent. Judicial identifications proved more likely to find in favor of the patient and consequently to allow the latter to obtain compensation. 7 5
Assessment of Damages
The most important difference between administrative and tort liability regimes lay in the assessment of compensation. For medical accidents, assessment was under the framework established by the Regulations of 200276 though the amounts payable were stipulated by reference to local conditions. 7 7 Taking Beijing as an example, the maximum sum of compensation payable in respect of a medical accident was approximately 100,000 RMB in 2010.78 But if the patient chose to sue the hospital on the basis of medical fault, the compensation was calculated in accordance with the principles ordinarily applicable to tort liability, 79 and the maximum compensation payable was much higher-about 400,000 RMB in 2010. The big differential of 300,000 RMB was mainly attributable to the award of compensation for death 80 that is made where the claim is brought in tort but not where it is brought under the administrative regulations.
The medical community argued that the general approach to the assessment of compensation for tortious personal injury should not apply to medical accidents, which should be governed exclusively by the 2002 Regulations. 8 1 However, it proved to be another story in practice, and at least 80. Id. at art. 29 (providing that compensation for death shall be payable at the rate of twenty times the per capita disposable income of urban residents, or per capita net income in the case of rural residents, at the locality of the court accepting the case (based on the previous year's income figures)). However, if the victim is age sixty or over, the period is reduced by one year for each year of age added; if the victim is age seventy-five or over, the period is calculated as five years. Id. 
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C. Effect on the Administrative Liability Regime
The increasing recourse to the ordinary principles of tortious liability had dramatic effects on the utilization of the administrative liability regime. Just three years after the 2002 Regulations were implemented, there were significantly fewer applications for technical identification as both medical institutions and patients sought to avoid the attribution of patient injury to a medical accident: the administrative liability regime was "left in the cold" by the parties concerned. 83 Patients turned to the GPCL because they wanted more compensation; hospitals, on the other hand, thought the administrative sanctions they faced under the 2002 Regulations too harsh because they might entail, in serious cases, an order by the health administration to suspend activities or the revocation of their practicing licenses, while the medical workers responsible for the accident would be subject to criminal investigation or, in less serious cases, disciplinary measures, as well as mandatory suspension of their activities and revocation of their practicing certificates. 84 To avoid these administrative sanctions, hospitals were often prepared to admit civil liability voluntarily, even if this meant paying more 
A. Antecedents
The dual system of liability and compensation for medical injury created chaos in practice, at a time when pressure for reform also came from the increasing number of disputes between doctors and patients, and widespread concerns about defensive medicine. 87 hospitals, there were on average over thirty lawsuits every year, and more than one million RMB was paid as compensation in them. Doctors were assaulted, threatened, and abused in 73 percent of all hospitals; in 60 percent of hospitals patients besieged and threatened hospital superintendents out of dissatisfaction with the outcomes of their treatment; in 77 percent of hospitals patients and their families refused to leave the premises or to pay their bill after treatment; in 62 percent of hospitals patients' families laid wreaths 
Increasing Disputes between Doctors and Patients
Concerns about Defensive Medical Treatments
The increasing number of hospital-related disputes raised concerns that medical personnel might be induced to carry out defensive and passive medical treatments to avoid liability, 90 though reliable empirical evidence that this in fact occurred is lacking.
According to a questionnaire survey of 487 clinicians shortly after the 2002 Regulations were implemented, 76 percent felt psychologically pressured; 42 percent said they were losing self-confidence.
9 1 It has also been claimed (though without reliable supporting data) that, to avoid lawsuits and compensation awards, medical institutions require patients as a matter of course to undergo excessive or unnecessary examinations, and that medical personnel also avoid offering or refuse to undertake risky interventions, and instead carry out only passive treatments which, though less likely to lead to iatrogenic injury, may not be in the patient's best interests. 92 Such attitudes may also have affected medical education and training. In 2002, in another questionnaire about the new Regulations' influence in this area, 35 percent of respondents said that they were unwilling to supervise interns, and 59 percent said that they were reluctant to instruct students in how to operate. The emergence of the dual liability system for medical malpractice can be attributed to three basic factors: first, the health administration's excessive emphasis on the uniqueness of medical institutions and its determination to give special protection to them; second, patients were forced to seek a more favorable compensation system to overcome the limits prescribed in the Regulations; and third, the court system tolerated a situation in which medical accident and medical fault were alternative causes of action, and even went so far as to create parallel systems for "identification" and the assessment of compensation. The disadvantages of such a state of affairs are obvious. The creation of a dual system under which limits on liability under the administrative regulations could easily be circumvented by recourse to the more favorable rules (so far as the patient was concerned) of ordinary tortious liability aggravated disputes between doctors and patients. Defensive and passive medical treatment-to the extent (if any) that it stemmed from the increased liabilities-harmed the interests of all patients, who could be obliged to pay for unnecessary examinations while at the same time being denied treatments which, though risky, were in their best interests. Lastly the disunity of judicial approaches harmed the authority of justice itself. This chaotic state of affairs was calling out for further reform by the time of the Tort Liability Law ( 
B. Legislative History
The TLL was the outcome of a long history of unsuccessful attempts at codification in P.R. China. Following previous failed attempts to introduce a Civil Code, it was decided to proceed incrementally by way of a series of enactments dealing with particular areas of civil law. 96 The first draft of the TLL was actually the title on tort liability (Title VIII) in a new draft Civil Code of 2002.97 This made no specific provision for medical liability. It was in the second draft of December 21, 2008, that a new chapter on Liability for Injury in Medical Treatment was added, reflecting the legislature's conclusion that a specific provision was necessary in view of the chaos that had arisen in practice. Apart from one significant amendment (relating to the burden of proof), 98 this was the regime introduced in the final version of the Law adopted on December 26, 2009.
The TLL had three basic goals in reforming the medical liability system: (1) to establish a single cause of action for medical malpractice to unify the application of law; (2) to seek a balance between the interests of the patient and the medical institution; and (3) to promote the sound development of state-funded medical services (Medicare). 99 Its approach may be evaluated by reference to the four basic elements which we have highlighted with respect to the preexisting liability regimes: namely, the basis of the cause of action, the burden of proof, the identification process, and the assessment of damages.
C. Four Dimensions of the TLL
Basis of the Cause of Action
The TLL adopts the term "liability for injury in medical treatment" to denote the field of its application. The language can be traced back to a Regulation issued by the Supreme People's Court in 2008, which used the The relevant chapter of the TLL begins with a general statement of the responsibility of the medical institution both for its own fault and for that of its medical staff. Article 54 of the TLL provides: "If a patient suffers injury in the course of medical diagnosis or treatment, and the medical institution or medical personnel are at fault, the medical institution shall bear compensatory liability."
This umbrella clause subsumes two specific liabilities for medical fault that the Law goes on to specify, dealing respectively with the breach of medical ethical duties and the breach of medical technical duties. As the provision makes clear, the medical institution's liability in each case may be either personal (i.e., for its own fault) or vicarious.1 02 Additionally, the same chapter of the TLL specifies a separate strict liability for the medical institution as the supplier of medical products. In all, then, the TLL provides for three basic types of liability for injury resulting from medical treatment, and these are now addressed in more detail in the sections be- 103. Yang, supra note 94, at 89.
a. Liability for Breaching Medical Ethical Duties
The first form of medical fault addressed in the TLL is the breach of medical ethical duties. In effect, this recognizes a liability for injury resulting from the failure to obtain informed consent to treatment. Article 55(1) of the TLL establishes the medical ethical duties in the following terms:
In the course of diagnosis and medical treatment, medical personnel shall give the patient an explanation of the nature of his illness and the medical measures proposed. If surgery, special examination, or special therapy needs to be carried out, the medical personnel shall give the patient a timely explanation of the medical treatment risks, alternative medical treatment plans, and other relevant considerations, and get his written permission. If it is not appropriate to give the explanation to the patient, the medical personnel shall give the explanation to the close relatives of the patient and get their written permission. 104 The second paragraph of Article 55 of the TLL provides for liability for breach of the specified duties: "[i]f the medical personnel fail to fulfill the duties in the preceding paragraph, and cause injury to the patient, their medical institution shall bear compensatory liability." It may be noted that the liability is for "injury," and not merely the violation of the patient's civil rights or interests, and that there appears therefore to be no right to compensation for infringement of the patient's autonomy or dignity in the absence of physical harm or serious emotional harm. 10 5
b. Liability for Breaching Medical Technical Duties
Article 57 of the TLL is about liability for breaching medical technical duties: "[i]f, in the course of diagnosis or medical treatment, medical personnel fail to fulfill the duty of diagnosis and medical treatment corresponding to the state of medical treatment then and there, and cause injury to the patient, their medical institution shall bear compensatory liability." As the content of the applicable standard of care ("the duty of diagnosis and medical treatment corresponding to the state of medical treatment then and there," i.e., at the time and place the treatment was given) is not speci-104. There is an exception to the above-mentioned information duties in Article 56 when it is impossible to seek the consent of the patient or his or her close relatives: "If, due to an emergency such as saving a patient on the verge of death, it is impossible to seek the consent of the patient or his close relatives, appropriate medical measures can be taken immediately upon approval by the principal of the medical institution or any authorized person." It should be emphasized that there is no duty on the principal of the medical institution or any authorized person to approve emergency medical measures. So this exception is just a privilege and does not entail a duty to act. fled in the TLL or in other legislation, it becomes a further question for the courts to decide.
c. Liability for Medical Products
The third type of medical liability covered by the TLL is with respect to injuries caused by medical products. Here the liability is strict rather than fault-based-even so far as the medical institution is concerned. However, where the patient claims compensation from the medical institution rather than the manufacturer of the product-or, as the case may be, a supplier of blood for transfusion-it has the right to indemnity from the liable manufacturer or supplier of blood. The reason for what (in international perspective) is a rather unusual strict liability on the medical institution as supplier is the special role played by hospitals in China as suppliers of pharmaceutical products. It is commonly recognized that Chinese hospitals derive a significant proportion of their income from the sale of drugs, and indeed that they profit from excessive and unnecessary sales. This is quite different from the situation in other countries. In fact, drug sales make up about 50 percent of the revenues of most hospitals in China. Taking Shanghai as an example, the total revenue of state-owned hospitals in 2007 was 39 billion RMB, which consisted of: (1) government subsidy of 3.64 billion RMB (9.5%); (2) income from the provision of medical services amounting to 16.94 billion RMB (43%); (3) drug sales amounting to 17.51 billion RMB (45%); and (4) income from other sources of 950 million RMB (2.5%). 106 The percentage of drug sales in the revenues of private hospitals is even higher than that in state-owned hospitals. Overall, the hospital system is the major outlet for the sale of medicines in China. In Shanghai, from 2002 to 2007, hospitals accounted for 79 percent of the drug market, compared with 21 percent comprised by drugstores.1 07 In 2009, the market for medicines in China as a whole was 580 billion RMB, of which hospitals accounted for 430 billion RMB (74%) and drugstores only 150 billion RMB (26%).os Driven by mutual financial interest with the drug companies, hospitals have become the only sellers of some drugs in China. If a defect in a drug, sterilizing agent or medical device, or a substandard blood transfusion, causes injury to a patient, the patient may claim compensation from the manufacturer or the blood supplying institution, or may claim compensation from the medical institution. If the patient claims compensation from the medical institution, after the medical institution has paid the compensation, it has the right to claim indemnity from the liable manufacturer or blood supplying institution.
Burden of Proof
The new law does not explicitly deal with proof of causation, 109 but makes significant changes in the principles applicable to the proof of fault. The burden of proving fault, or (as the case may be) the absence of fault, on the part of the medical institution is no longer on the hospital or doctor (as it was under the SPC Stipulations on Evidence in Civil Litigation)110 but primarily on the patient. According to the new law, if a patient suffers injury in the course of diagnosis or medical treatment, and the medical institution or its medical personnel are at fault, the medical institution shall bear compensatory liability."' On the other hand, fault on the part of the medical institution is presumed in special circumstances. If a patient is injured, and any of the following circumstances apply, fault on the part of the medical institution is taken to be established unless the medical institution proves the contrary: (1) violation of provisions of laws, administrative regulations, ministerial rules, or other standards regarding diagnosis and medical treatment; (2) concealing or refusing to provide medical record materials related to the dispute; and (3) falsifying, distorting, or destroying medical record materialS.112
In fact, this provision is a significantly watered-down version of what was proposed when the reform of tort law was revived in 2008 with the publication of a second draft of the Tort Liability Law (building on the first draft included in the proposal for a Civil Code of 2002). The second draft included a reversal of the burden of proof by which, if a patient's injury appeared to be caused by a diagnosis or medical treatment by medical personnel, a causal relationship between such diagnosis or treatment and the harm suffered by the patient would be presumed unless the medical personnel provided proof to the contrary.11 3 This provision was deleted in the third draft of November 6, 2009114 and does not appear in the TLL as enacted. This may be understood as the implicit rejection of presumed causation in the area of medical malpractice. So far as patients are concerned, the new law thus marks a step backwards not only from the presumption of both fault and causation under the approach previously adopted by the SPC, but also (insofar as proof of causation is concerned) from the second draft of 2008.
The Identification Procedure
Unfortunately, the TLL does not resolve the controversial question of who should act as the organizer of the identification process it requires. However, just one day before the TLL was to enter into force, the SPC issued a Notice Addressing Several Issues Relating to the Application of the Tort Liability Lawl 15 according to Article 3 of which a people's court applying the TLL in a case where technical identification is required shall itself take responsibility for organizing the process.11 6 In other words, there should be a judicial identification, not an identification by a committee appointed by the health administration.
Assessment of Damages
There is no special provision in the TLL dealing with compensation for injury arising from medical treatment. Consequently, the general approach applicable to compensation for tortious personal injury, found in Articles 16 to 23 of the Law, is to be followed. Article 16 of the TLL provides:
One who infringes on the rights or interests of another, and causes physical injury, shall compensate for the reasonable expenses of medical care, nursing, and transportation, etc., for the purposes of therapy and restoring good health, as well as for reduced income due to loss of working time. One who causes disability shall also pay for the cost of prostheses and compensation for disability. One who causes death shall also pay funeral expenses and death benefits. 1 1 8 The succeeding Articles of the TLL deal (inter alia) with compensation on death (Article 18) and compensation for serious emotional damage (Article 22).119
VI. ANOTHER STEP BACKWARDS ON ITS WAY?
The reform of tort liability for medical malpractice in China is still a work in progress, and it seems certain that there will be further reform, whether by incorporation of the rules of tortious liability for medical malpractice in a Civil Code, or a specific enactment on medical treatment or medical malpractice,1 20 or by a comprehensive SPC interpretation that directly addresses all unresolved questions. Whether the direction of such reform will be "forwards" or "backwards" remains to be seen, but our inclination is to think that it will be the latter, if only because the TLL fails to resolve a number of disputed issues related to the four dimensions highlighted for analysis in this paper and, by default, seems to validate solutions favoring the medical community's interests over those of patients. We now briefly address each of the four in turn, highlighting possible options for further reform.
First, in considering the basis of the cause of action, it seems likely that clarification will be required of the standard of care to which doctors are held in performing their technical duties. The "then and there" 12 1 medi-cal standard adopted as the criterion to judge medical misconduct is arguably too imprecise, and should be supplemented with reference to specific factors. In fact, the second draft of the TLL contained a provision (deleted in the final version) which expressly required the court to consider the location of the medical institution, its accreditation, and the qualifications of its medical personnel. 1 22 An almost identical provision has now found its way into guidance issued to the local courts in Beijing by the city's Higher People's Court. 123 In a country so large and with such substantial differences in healthcare delivery between different areas-especially between urban and rural areas-it is easy to see that such a provision might be considered desirable. However, insofar as it rubber-stamps local practice even if it fails to attain reasonable quality standards, such reform could well be seen as contrary to the interests of patients. Another possible reform adverse to such interests would be the introduction of limits on the liability of medical institutions for defective pharmaceutical products. Arguably, it is unfair to treat medical institutions as sellers (and, as such, strictly liable for defects) in cases of all types. At the least, since blood suppliers in China are nonprofit institutions who act in the public interest, there seems to be a case for introducing a cap on their liability in damages. From the patient's perspective, the best that could be said for such a reform is that it would serve to ensure the continued supply of blood for transfusion in the interests of all patients.
Secondly, regarding the burden of proof, the major open question is proof of causation. Under the pre-TLL approach of the SPC, the burden of proving the absence of a causal relationship between the medical treatment and the patient's injury, as well as the absence of medical fault, fell on the hospital.1 24 The TLL puts the burden of proving fault on the patient in most cases-though Article 59 prescribes a set (albeit limited) of factors whose presence raises a presumption of fault-but it does not deal explicitly with the burden of causation, which is not unimportant in medical cases. It seems likely that, in the absence of a specific provision in the TLL, the referring to local practice, and does not mean (for example) imposing the standards of the big cities on practitioners in remote rural localities. burden of proving causation will follow the ordinary rule, and therefore fall on the plaintiff. It is arguable, however, that a more nuanced approach is necessary to balance the interests of the competing parties, and in particular to make allowance for the information and resource asymmetry that very often obstructs proof of causation. We therefore take the liberty of suggesting that Chinese law should follow the German approach of shifting the burden of proving causation to the hospital in cases of gross negligence in medical treatment. 125 The serious character of the treatment error provides a reason for moving the risk of causal uncertainty from the patient to the hospital. Thirdly, we come to the identification process, which is likely to be the most important practical problem relating to medical malpractice suits to arise in the immediate future.1 26 As patients do not trust technical identifications conducted by the health administration, and hospitals do not trust judicial identifications, scholars have suggested the adoption of a combined system.1 27 Judicial identification under the charge of a specified person would be maintained and carried out in a different jurisdiction from that in which the injury occurred in order to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the local medical association, and any perception that it might be deliberately protecting its members. At the same time, technical identification would be conducted by clinical professionals together with medicolegal experts to guarantee an objective and just identification result. Although such a process involves a duplication of resources, the hope is that it would ultimately command more respect-at least in cases where the two processes come to the same result.
Turning lastly to the assessment of compensation, the principal question awaiting resolution is whether the general approach adopted in the TLL with respect to personal injury leaves room for special rules in the area of medical malpractice. It is quite conceivable that pressure could mount to enact rules limiting the damages recoverable in tort by reference to existing provisions of the Medical Accident Regulations, for example, the apportionment of liability by reference to the respective roles played by the medical fault and the patient's preexisting condition. 128 As a cap currently applies to compensation for emotional harm in medical malpractice claims brought under the administrative liability regime,1 29 this too could conceivably be adopted for the purposes of liability in tort, if it is considered useful to limit the liability of medical institutions. Neither of these possible reforms would be in the interests of patients.
CONCLUSION
P.R. China faces numerous healthcare challenges in the coming years as it strives to develop an equitable system of universal health care for its citizens. Relative to the magnitude of that task, the development of appropriate mechanisms to provide compensation and accountability with respect to medical injuries is a rather small matter. Yet it is not unimportant. The popular unrest provoked by the perceived unfairness of the liability system in the early years of the present century sat ill with the commitment to "social harmony and stability" that is proclaimed in the opening Article of the new Tort Liability Law.1 30 It is still too early to assess, however, whether the steps taken forwards and backwards, to the left and to the right, as the "dance pattern" of the reform process has slowly unfolded, have adequately balanced the rights and interests of the dancing partners, or to predict what new steps they will be required to learn in the future. 
